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ABSTRACT 
Vehicular communications play a substantial role in providing safety transportation by means of safety 
message exchange. Researchers have proposed several solutions for securing safety messages. Protocols 
based on a fixed key infrastructure are more efficient in implementation and maintain stronger security 
in comparison with dynamic structures. The purpose of this paper present a method based on a fixed key 
infrastructure for detection  impersonation attack, in other words, Sybil attack, in  the vehicular ad 
hoc network. This attack, puts a great impact on  performance of  the network. The proposed method, 
using an cryptography mechanism to detection Sybil attack. Finally, using Mat lab simulator the 
results of this approach are reviewed, This method  it has low delay for detection Sybil attack, 
because most operations are done in Certification Authority, so this proposed schema is a efficient 
method for detection Sybil attack. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a specific type of Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) 
that provides communication between (1) nearby vehicles and (2) vehicles and nearby roadside 
equipments. VANETs are one way to implement Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), a 
technique for imparting information and communication technology to transport infrastructure 
and vehicles. It is based on IEEE 802.11p standard for Wireless Access for Vehicular 
Environment (WAVE). These networks have no fixed infrastructure, and they rely on the 
themselves for implementing any network functionality. A VANET is a decentralized network 
as every node performs the functions of both host and router. The main benefit of VANET 
communication is enhancement of passenger safety by exchanging warning messages between 
vehicles. VANETs differ from MANETs in high mobility of nodes, large scale of networks, 
geographically constrained topology, and frequent network fragmentation. Most of the research 
on VANET is focused on Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and the network layer . 
VANETS aim to build applications such as collision avoidance, route changing, and so on. 
Security of vehicular networks is still largely an explored area. VANET, being a wireless 
network, inherits all the security threats that a wireless system has to deal with. VANET 
security is critical because a poorly designed VANET is vulnerable to network attacks, and this 
can compromise the safety of drivers. A security system should ensure that transmission comes 
from a trusted source and is not a tampered en-route by other sources. It should also strike a 
balance with privacy because implementing security and privacy together in a system is 
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contradictory. There are various types of possible attacks on VANETs. It is imperative that 
VANET security should be capable of handling every type of attack. VANET security is 
different from that of wireless and wired networks because of its unique characteristics of 
mobility constraints, infrastructure-less framework, and short duration of link between nodes. In 
a wired network, infrastructure has components for specific functions, for example, routers 
decide the route to destination while network hosts send and receive messages. Security 
implementation is relatively easy as networks need to be physically tampered for 
eavesdropping. Wireless networks use infrared or radio frequency signals to communicate 
among devices. These networks can be either (a) infrastructure based or (b) infrastructure-less. 
Infrastructure-based wireless networks are based on Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) switches, MSCs, base stations, and mobile hosts. In ad-hoc networks, a type of 
infrastructure-less wireless networks, nodes perform all operations such as routing, packet 
forwarding, and network management, and so on. The existing security solutions use traditional 
digital signature and certificates using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
In VANETs, primary focus of security is on safety-related applications. Non safety applications 
have less stringent security requirements. There is no prior trust relationship between the nodes 
of VANETs because of its infrastructure-less nature. Any node can join and leave the network 
at anytime without informing other nodes in vicinity. Cooperative security schemes are more 
efficient in VANETs as node misbehavior can be detected through collaboration between the 
number of nodes by assuming that majority of nodes are honest. 
 In vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), vehicles are exchanged information such 
as their status, accidental, potentially dangerous situations and … In the form 
of messages  between each other. With interpreting and processing these messages, drivers 
become aware of the situation and appropriate decisions are taken to prevent accidents. 
Obviously, the publication of false information in addition to reduce network performance lead 
to financial and even physical damage. Sybil attack, is a serious threat as it impairs the 
functionality of VANETs. In this attack, an attacker node sends messages with multiple 
identities to other nodes in the network. The attacker simulates several nodes in the network. 
The node spoofing the identities of other nodes is called malicious node/Sybil attacker, and the 
nodes whose identities are spoofed are called Sybil nodes. Almost every other attack can be 
launched in a network in the presence of Sybil attack. One possibility could be an illusion of a 
traffic jam or accident so that other vehicles change their routing path or leave the road for the 
benefit of the attacker. Sybil attacker can also inject false information in the networks via some 
fabricated nonexistent nodes [1 , 2 , 3].  
Using a node with nature of Sybil, may are affected on some types of network services such as 
routing, data traffic congestion in the network, fair allocation of resources, make decisions, 
recognition abuse any may reduce performance and quality of services in these networks. 
purpose of this paper present a method for detection  impersonation attack based on 
cryptography. 
2. ATTACKS ON VEHICULAR NETWORKS 
Before designing any security solution for VANETs [17,18], we should know different types of 
security threats, their capabilities, and the types of attackers also. 
2.1. Classification of Attackers 
Attackers can be classified according to scope, nature, and behavior of attacks [19,20]. Some 
types of attackers are discussed in following paragraph: 
1. Some attackers eavesdrop only on the wireless channel to collect traffic information which 
may be passed onto other attackers. As these attackers do not participate in the communication 
process of the network, they are called passive attackers. On the other hand, some attackers 
either generate packets containing wrong information or do not forward the received packets. 
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These are called active attackers. 
2. Attacker may be an authentic member of a VANET having authentic public keys and access 
to other members of the network. Such attackers are called insider. Outside attackers (outsider) 
are intruders and they can launch attacks of less diversity. 
3. Some attackers are not personally benefited from the attack. Their aim is to harm other 
members of the network or disrupt the functionality of a VANET. These attackers are 
malicious. 
On the other hand, rational attacker seeks personal benefit and is more predictable in terms 
of type and target of the attack. 
4. Local attacker launches an attack with a limited scope, that is, an attack is restricted to 
a particular area. An attack can be extended, where an attacker can control several entities 
distributed across the network. 
 
2.2. Types of Attacks 
Owing to the large number of autonomous network members and the presence of human factor, 
misbehavior of nodes in future vehicular networks cannot be ruled out. Several types of attacks 
[20] have been identified and classified on the basis of layers used by the attacker. At the 
physical and link layer, an attacker can disturb the network system by overloading the 
communication channel with useless messages. An attacker can inject false messages or 
rebroadcast an old message also. Some attackers can tamper with an OBU or destroy an RSU. 
At network layer, an attacker can insert false routing messages or overload the system with 
routing information. Privacy of drivers can be disclosed by revealing and tracking the position 
of drivers. Some of these attacks are briefly explained subsequently. 
2.2.1. Bogus Information 
In this case, attackers are insiders, rational, and active. They can send wrong information in the 
network so that it can affect the behavior of other drivers. For example, an adversary can inject 
wrong information about a nonexistent traffic jam or an accident diverting vehicles to other 
routes and freeing a route for itself. 
2.2.2. Cheating with Sensor Information 
This attack is launched by an attacker who is insider, rational, and active. He uses this attack to 
alter the perceived position, speed, and direction of other nodes in order to escape liability in 
case of any mishap. 
2.2.3. ID Disclosure 
An attacker is insider, passive, and malicious. It can monitor trajectories of a target vehicle and 
can use this information for determining the ID of a vehicle. 
2.2.4. Denial of Service (DOS) 
Attacker is malicious, active, and local in this case. Attacker may want to bring down the 
network by sending unnecessary messages on the channel. Example of this attack includes 
channel jamming and injection of dummy messages. 
2.2.5. Replaying and Dropping Packets 
An attacker may drop legitimate packets. For example, an attacker can drop all the alert 
messages meant for warning vehicles proceeding toward the accident location. Similarly, an 
attacker can replay the packets after that event has been occurred to create the illusion of 
accident. 
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2.2.6. Hidden Vehicle 
This type of attack is possible in a scenario where vehicles smartly try to reduce the congestion 
on the wireless channel. For example, a vehicle has sent a warning message to its neighbours 
and it is awaiting a response. After receiving a response, the vehicle realizes that its neighbour 
is in a better position to forward the warning message and stops sending this message to other 
nodes. This is because it assumes that its neighbour will forward the message to other nodes. If 
this neighbor node is an attacker, it can be fatal for the system. 
2.2.7. Worm Hole Attack 
It is challenging to detect and prevent this attack. A malicious node can record packets at one 
location in the network and tunnel them to other location through a private network shared with 
malicious nodes. Severity of the attack increases if the malicious node sends only control 
messages through the tunnel and not data packets. 
2.2.8. Sybil Attack 
In this attack, a vehicle forges the identities of multiple vehicles. These identities can be used to 
play any type of attack in the system. These false identities also create an illusion that there are 
additional vehicles on the road. Consequence of this attack is that every type of attack can be 
played after spoofing the positions or identities of other nodes in the network. 
3. DETECTION OF SYBIL ATTACK 
In literature, different techniques are proposed for detection of Sybil attack in VANETs. Sybil 
attacks are always possible in the absence of any logical centralized authority. As there is no 
centralized entity in VANETs, detection of Sybil attacks is very difficult. Some constraints such 
as validating all entities simultaneously by all nodes and strict coordination among entities are 
necessary for detection of a Sybil attack. Some techniques are described below. 
3.1. Directional Antenna  
This technique, can be used to detect Sybil attack discussed in[3]. This method is 
used to direction of arrival  packets and It checks whether the messages has been come 
from forged  neighbours or  neighbours real. This method is not perfect because 
it sometimes does not detect some attacks. 
3.2. Propagation Model 
Sybil attack can also be detected by using a propagation model as described in[4,5,6]. In this 
technique, the received signal power from a sending node is matched with its claimed position. 
By using this method, received signal power can be used to calculate the position of the node. If 
both the positions (calculated and claimed) do not match, this may be a Sybil node. This 
technique is unsuitable for detection of a Sybil attack as a malicious node can use the same 
propagation model to compute the transmission signal strength required to fool detection 
system in estimating the next position of the node. Signal strength approach has a limited 
accuracy. Small-scale attacks cannot be detected. It is very difficult for a malicious vehicle to 
change signal strength distribution. Any change in signal strength will, therefore, be detected by 
a receiver. If each vehicle is given limited space, malicious vehicles can fabricate only few 
Sybil nodes. More realistic radio propagation model is required to support high mobility of 
nodes in VANETs. 
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3.3. Resource Testing 
This technique, can be used to detect Sybil attack discussed in[4,6,7,15]. It is assumed that 
every physical entity is equipped with limited computational resources. A typical puzzle is 
given to all the nodes in the network for testing computational resources. If resources of a 
single node are used to simulate multiple entities, any particular entity will be resource 
constrained in computation, storage, and bandwidth. This approach is not suitable as an attacker 
may have more computational resources when compared with honest nodes. Yet another 
problem is that this technique may create network congestion because more number of 
requests/replies are used for identification of nodes. Radio resource testing can also be used for 
detecting Sybil nodes. It is based on the assumption that any node has only one radio so any 
radio cannot send and receive more than one channel at a time. This technique also fails 
because the attacker can use multiple radio devices simultaneously. 
 
3.4. Detection and localization of nodes 
This technique, can be used to detect Sybil attack discussed in [5,8]. This method is based 
on finding the physical location of nodes and comparing it with the vehicle's position is to 
claim . so this attack is discovered . This solution is the geometric method and also uses data 
obtained from GPS.  
3.5. Public Key Cryptography 
Security issue of Sybil attacks can be solved by using public key cryptography and 
authentication mechanism as described in [10,11]. In this security solution, signatures are 
combined with digital certificates and asymmetric cryptography is used. Certificates are issued 
by CA and there is a hierarchy of these CAs. For each region, there is one CA. These CAs 
communicate with each other through secure channel and keep track of issued certificates used 
by every signed message. This technique can prevent Sybil attacks as only messages with valid 
certificates are considered and invalid messages are ignored. The only requirement is that 
each node should be assigned one certificate at a time. For privacy implementation, these 
certificates are changed from time-to-time. But in VANETs, it is difficult to deploy PKI as 
there is no guarantee of the presence of infrastructure. It is very complex, consumes large 
memory, and time consuming as well.  
3.6. Timestamp Series 
This technique, can be used to detect Sybil attack discussed in [9] In this approach, proposed a 
timestamp series approach to defend against Sybil attack in a vehicular ad hoc network 
(VANET) based on roadside unit support. it discover that it would be rare for arbitrary two 
vehicles to pass through a few different RSUs (far apart from each other) always at the same 
time. Therefore, if a traffic message sent out by any vehicle contains several timestamps issued 
to this vehicle by the previously passed RSUs, Sybil attack can be detected if multiple traffic 
messages contain very similar series of timestamps. This method has challenges, for example If 
RSUs are located at intersections, it may make the Sybil attack detection difficult, so this 
method not suitable approach to detect Sybil attack. 
4. THE PROPOSED SCHEMA 
The proposed schema uses encryption mechanism to detects attack and provides Four security 
aspects are concerned in this method: 
4.1. Authentication 
Every receiver vehicle should make sure of message transmitter’s authority and authenticate it. 
In normal network system, each vehicle must have a certificate for transmission, and this allows 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.6, November 2011 
190 
 
 
 
each vehicle to transmit even if it considered as adversary, common idea is the use of 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), CRL will keep the ability for the vehicle to transmit, if any 
vehicle receives information from a revoked vehicle it will accept the information and apply the 
id of the sender to the CRL, if the id in the list the receiver will ignore the message, otherwise it 
will take it, this procedure causes network overhead for frequent retransmission of CRL and 
causes high computation overhead for each vehicle when receiving any information, and again 
allows the adversary vehicle to transmit, in some situations the receiving vehicle may accept the 
information received from adversary, as not all vehicles have the updated CRL. In this work 
provide each vehicle with special certificate; this certificate will insure the intention status of 
the vehicle, a Valid Certificate (VC) will be given to the valid vehicle (I mean: not adversary), 
and Adversary Certificate (AC) for adversary vehicle. Use of  this idea cause to 
performance is increased. Once, vehicle requested for key  or send a message, if  it has a Valid 
Certificate key Be assigned to him else if it has a Adversary Certificate, not Be assigned to him 
and Will not receive a message from it[10,11,14]. 
 
4.2. Non-repudiation 
Every vehicle should put part of its personal information so it can be recognized in the case of 
crime occurrence and insurance. Thus, repudiation becomes impossible by the transmitter. 
vehicle’s identity should be attached to the message, so it can be tracked whenever desired and 
Non-repudiation established. Accordingly, vehicle tracking is only allowed just for authorized 
organization. So the vehicle should encrypt its identity and only authorized organizations is 
capable of decryption. Hence, encryption of car’s identity should be done by means of assigned 
public key (PU) from authorized organization and be put in a distinct field to inside original 
message. Since vehicle’s identity is encrypted by a public key, other vehicles are not able to 
recognize it and just authorized organization own the private key associated to the public key 
can access its identity. 
 
4.3. Privacy 
Personal information of vehicles and drivers shouldn’t be accessible by other vehicles and the 
anonymity should be preserved to stop tracking. The exception is for authorized organizations. 
in this work we use private key to provided privacy.  
 
4.4. Data Integrity 
The transmitted message should contain valid information not to be altered by attackers. 
the  hash function in addition  to encryption of messages ,it summarizes them, and so enhance 
the network performance. Other methods  of encryption  are time consuming and reduce 
network performance. so We  to raise the efficiency use the hash function to encryption. Hash 
message authentication codes (HMAC) sign packets to verify that the information received is 
exactly the same as the information sent. This is called integrity. HMACs provide integrity 
through a keyed hash, the result of a mathematical calculation on a message using a hash 
function combined with a shared, secret key. 
This method is easier to manage the CA, a city or a country are divided into the 
different regions(n). It’s noticeable that one key pairs of authentication key and public key are 
needed for message exchange in each region, thus regions under CA coverage should not have 
any common area [7,8,10]. 
 
},...,,{ 21 nRRRR =  
 
φ=∩ ji RR                    i≤1   ,   nj ≤   ,    ji ≠  
 
CAl, manages a local public key Which is valid only in its areas. CAh, is hold the 
initial certification and information of vehicles. 
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4.5. How It Works 
Sybil attack detection phases is shown in Figure 1. in this figure malicious node with M, Sybil 
node with S and The Node that is the identity of his spoofing with A is labaled. 
In phase1, each vehicle should be registered in a group and receive its public authentication key 
(AK) before any message transmission. For signing a message, the vehicle uses group 
authentication key and encryption function and sends it along with original message to other 
vehicle and RSU. Therefore it is not obligatory for each member to have other members’ 
private information such as their identity and public key for authenticating them. Receivers 
verify a member’s authenticity by signature verification. It’s attained by reconfirmation of 
encryption function with authentication key to the received message and comparing the result to 
the signature. Also, receivers can make sure of transmitted data integrity  [16]. 
 
},),(,{ IDhAK OBUCAMHM  
 
OBUID, is as follows: 
 
l
CAAKASKAAID MHIDHIDOBU ))}(|(,{=  
 
In phase2, Because RSU don’t  have  a private key of CAl, so RSU can not decrypt 
the message. it  sending a request to CAl to decrypted of the OBUID, in this phase decrypted 
only IDA. 
In phase3, because CAl don’t have private key of vehicle A, so CAl can not decrypted 
HSK(IDA|HAK(M)) , therefore send a request private key of vehicle A to the CAh. 
In phase4, CAh reply private key of vehicle A to CAl and CAl attained by reconfirmation of 
encryption function with key of vehicle A to the (IDA|HAK(M)) and comparing the result to the 
HSK(IDA|HAK(M)). Also, CAl can detect the Sybil attack , if result of this comparison is 
different. The Notations used during a Message transmission in 4 phase are shown in Tab.1. 
 
 
 
Algorithm used for Sybil attack detection 
 
1- EH(PUAK(M)) from source node S 
2- EH(SKA(IDA| HAK(M))) from source node S 
3- E(PUCA(IDA, HSKA(IDA| HAK(M)))) from node S 
4- SEND(RQST(M,HAK(M),CAh,OBUId) from source node S to local RSU other 
vehicle in local region) 
5- EH(PUAK(M)) in RSU and IF(HAK(M)==HAK(M)) THEN go to step 7 else go to 
step 6 
6- REPORT to CAl  “the message is fault” 
7- D(SKCl(IDA, HSKA(IdA| HAK(M))) in CAl  
8- REQST(PUA) to CAh 
9- RPLY(PUA) to CAl  
10- EH(SKA(IDA|HAK(M))) and IF(HSKA(IDA|HAK(M))==HSKA(IDA|HAK(M))) 
THEN Sybil attack detect. 
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Table 1.  Notation  
Notation   Means 
RQST Request from source node 
RPLY Reply from VANET server 
SEND Send key from VANET server to 
destination 
E (…) Encryption of Message 
EH(…) Encryption of Message with hashing function 
D (…) Decryption of Message 
 PUA Public key for source node A 
SKA Private Key for source node A 
M Original message 
AK Shared key between all nodes is located in a area 
HAK(M) Encryption message with Key AK  
CAh Home CA or initial CA 
CAl Local CA 
IDA Identifier of vehicle 
 
 
                   
Figure 1.  Phases of detection of Sybil attack 
4.6. Analysis and Evaluation 
A good security mechanism has short delay for encryption, decryption and key exchange. In 
this proposed scheme is used Matlab tool for simulation. for sending safety message vehicles 
generate message digest by means of HMAC function and encrypt ID with P-224 curve, in this 
simulation number of messages that report accident is assume is 5 and number of vehicle is 
variable to draw these diagrams.  
The HMAC operation is very faster than encryption and its delay is not considerable in 
comparison with encryption delay. In reception of message, the vehicle only generate message 
digest with AK and compares it with received message digest that takes very short time. Other 
decryption processes are accomplished by CA that does not influence overall delay. Since 
frequency of safety message reception is more than its transmission, this method is acceptable. 
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According above mentioned process, a total delay (D) occurs that this delay is related to factors 
such as degree of closeness to RSU, connection style of components and overload of the 
components (RSU, CA). 
Execution time of this algorithm is low, because most operations are done in Certification 
Authority, so the proposed method is a best method for detection of Sybil attacks. 
 
Calculate of total delay: 
Total delay= T1+T2+T3+T4   
                                
(1) 
 
T1 means, delay of phase1(delay of broad cast the message to other vehicle and RSU ) and T2 
means, delay of phase2(delay of actions in RSU, such as receive messages and              
categorize messages based on type of event and management of key and compare message with 
hashed message to find message encrypt with valid key) and T3 means delay of 
phase3(encryption of messages in CAL) and T4 means delay of phase4(delay of receive key 
from CAh). 
  
Figure 2.  Delay of detect Sybil along number of vehicle 
 
 Figure 3.  Number of message along number of vehicle 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents  a method base on cryptography to detect Sybil attack in VANET. Result of 
simulation shown that Execution time of this algorithm is low, because most operations is 
done in Certification Authority, so the proposed method is a best method for detection of Sybil 
attacks. The simulations  indicates that, delay  of detection  Sybil attack depends on the number 
of messages not to number of vehicles. In our future work we would like to discover location of  
malicious node, because this nodes is important problem in this type of attacks, prevents of 
other attacks if malicious nodes is identify. This proposed schema have a problem, that, if nodes 
move to other rejoins, detection of Sybil attack does not work properly, so in future work we 
would like to improved this method to detection of Sybil attack execute properly and 
completely. 
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